The Law Firm Of RAVEN & AWERKAMP, P.C. POST OFFICE BOX 3017 TUCSON, AZ 85702-3017 (520) 628-8700

Anne C. Graham-Bergin, #011504
Attorney for Intervenor 
 
 

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF PINAL

ANAM, INC.; an Arizona corporation, and ELAINE HELZER, a citizen and qualified elector of Pinal County, Plaintiffs, v PINAL COUNTY, a body politic; GILBERT HOYOS, in his official capacity as Pinal County Director of Elections; LAURA DEAN-LYTLE, in her official capacity as Pinal County Recorder, Defendants and PINAL CITIZENS FOR SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES, INC., an Arizona corporation, Intervenor.

No. CV 2001-00610 INTERVENOR’S RESPONSE TO PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Assigned to Judge O’Neil

 

       Intervenor Pinal Citizens for Sustainable Communities, Inc. ("Citizens"), through undersigned counsel, responds to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment on the basis that issues of factual dispute exist precluding entry of summary judgment at this time as detailed in the accompanying Memorandum of Points and Authorities. 

       Dated this day of October, 2001.

Raven & Awerkamp, P.C.

__________________________________ 

Anne C. Graham-Bergin
Attorney for Intervenor 

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES

       Plaintiffs challenge referendum petitions circulated by Citizens against a rezoning they sought which was approved by the Pinal County Board of Supervisors on May 16, 2001. The following are the relevant facts:
 

I. Facts.

1. On or about May 16, 2001, the Pinal County Board of Supervisors approved a rezoning and a PAD request upon behalf of Plaintiffs and adopted Ordinances PZ-006-01 and PZ-PD-006-01.

2. Shortly after the meeting on May 16, 2001, Mary Ellen Kazda and her husband Frank Pierson went to the Pinal County Department of Elections and submitted an Application for Petition Serial Number (the "Application") on behalf of Intervenor to Mr. Gilbert Hoyos, the Director of Elections. 

3. Mr. Hoyos accepted the completed Application and advised Ms. Kazda that the Application failed to contain the petition description of the matter being referred. Ms. Kazda responded by pointing out that the petition description was described on a separate sheet of paper which was attached to the Application. Mr. Hoyos confirmed this and reviewed the attachment. 

4. After reviewing the Application, Mr. Hoyos inserted the number of signatures required to be obtained and the serial number for the petition. Mr. Hoyos did not insert a due date for the petition because he stated that the materials for circulation were not available at that time. At no time during the meeting with Mr. Hoyos did he ever indicate to Ms. Kazda or Mr. Pierson that they were obligated to provide the materials to circulation to him. Further, he never stated to Ms. Kazda or Mr. Pierson that they should obtain the materials for circulation from any other department or person within the Pinal County government. Mr. Hoyos advised Ms. Kazda to return to his office in a week to obtain the materials for circulation.

5. On May 23, 2001, Ms. Kazda telephoned Mr. Hoyos in the morning to make sure the materials for circulation would be available if she went to the office to obtain them. Mr. Hoyos advised Ms. Kazda that the materials were not available. Mr. Hoyos indicated to Ms. Kazda that he would contact her when the materials became available.

6. Neither Ms. Kazda nor Mr. Pierson received any calls from Mr. Hoyos or anyone in his office between May 23, 2001 and May 30, 2001. On May 30, 2001 at approximately 1:00 p.m., Ms. Kazda telephoned Mr. Hoyos and asked if the materials were available. Mr. Hoyos advised her that the materials were still not available at that time but that he would get back to her later that day. Ms. Kazda placed a second call to Mr. Hoyos at 3:30 about the materials. Mr. Hoyos advised Ms. Kazda that he was having his employee Irma Madrid call "upstairs" about the materials. He advised Ms. Kazda that his office was "staying on top of it." At about 3:50, Ms. Kazda telephoned Mr. Hoyos again about the materials. Mr. Hoyos advised her that he had been in contact with the County Attorney’s office about the situation "to make sure we get it right." Just before 5:00 p.m., Ms. Kazda placed a final call to Mr. Hoyos about the materials and he again advised her that the materials were not available.

7. On May 31, 2001, Ms. Kazda and Mr. Pierson went to the Department of Elections to try and obtain the materials. They arrived mid-morning. Mr. Hoyos advised them that he had in his possession the minutes from the Board of Supervisors’ meeting of May 16, 2001 but did not have the rest of the materials. He asked them to wait. After about one hour of waiting, Mr. Hoyos presented to them a portion of ordinances/resolutions approving the rezoning and PAD. Later, he obtained an additional ordinance and resolution and presented them to Ms. Kazda and Mr. Pierson. 

8. After presenting all the materials to Ms. Kazda and Mr. Pierson, Mr. Hoyos then inserted a due date of July 2, 2001 on the Application. He calculated the due date by using a wall calendar to count the number of days, using June 1 as day 1. Mr. Hoyos stated that because the 30th day fell on a weekend, the petitions would be due the following Monday, July 2, because the Department of Elections’ office was not open on the weekends.

9. Before leaving the Department of Elections, Ms. Kazda and Mr. Pierson asked Mr. Hoyos if the deadline for submitting the petitions was correct and if the materials for circulation provided represented all the materials necessary for circulation. Mr. Hoyos advised that the deadline was accurate and the materials were complete but that he would have the packet checked with the County Attorney. Ms. Kazda and Mr. Pierson returned to the Department of Elections later that day and were advised that after reviewing them, the County Attorney determined that the materials were correct. A Memo written by Department of Elections’ employee Becky Canalez dated May 31, 2001 confirms that the County Attorney approved the materials provided to Citizens.

10. On July 2, 2001, Citizens turned in approximately 433 petition sheets bearing approximately 5,873 signatures to the Director of Elections.

11. On July 19, 2001, the Pinal County Director of Elections issued his certification indicating that the referendum petitions contained sufficient signatures.

II. Law.

1. A.R.S. Requires the Director of Elections to Supply a Referendum Petition Proponent with a True and Correct Copy of the Materials to be Circulated.

Plaintiffs argue that because copies of the approved ordinances approving the rezoning and PAD were available from either the clerk of the board of supervisors or the county recorder on or shortly after May 16, 2001, the time period for circulating the petitions began on May 16, 2001, not May 31, 2001. Plaintiffs misread the applicable provisions of Title 19 governing initiative and referendum at the local level.

A.R.S. §19-141(A) provides as follows:

A. The provisions of this chapter [Title 19] shall apply to the legislation of cities, towns and counties, except as specifically provided to the contrary in this article. The duties of the secretary of state as to state legislation shall be performed in connection with such legislation by the city or town clerk, county officer in charge of elections or person performing the duties as such. . .

       Under this section, the county officer in charge of elections is responsible for "such legislation" that is referable at the county level. The designation of the county officer in charge of elections is specific. The statute does not provide that the clerk of the board of supervisors is responsible for "such legislation" or that the county recorder is responsible for "such legislation". For matters involving cities and towns, the duties of the secretary of state are performed by the city or town clerk.

A.R.S. §19-142(C) and (D) provide as follows:

C. At the time a person or organization intending to file a referendum petition against an ordinance or resolution applies for the issuance of an official number pursuant to section 19-111, the city or town clerk shall provide such person or organization with a full and correct copy of the ordinance or resolution in the form as finally adopted. If the copy of the ordinance or resolution proposed as a referendum is not available to such person or organization at the time of making application for an official number or on the same business day as the application is submitted, the thirty day period prescribed in subsection A of this section begins on the day that the ordinance or resolution is available from the city of town clerk, and the ordinance or resolution shall not become operative until thirty days after the ordinance is available.    D. Notwithstanding subsection C of this section, a person or organization may file a referendum petition against the rezoning of a parcel of property on the approval by the city or town council of the ordinance that adopts the rezoning or on the approval of that portion of the minutes of the city of town council that includes the council’s approval of the rezoning, whichever occurs first. The thirty day period prescribed in subsection A of this section begins on the day that the rezoning ordinance or approved minutes or portion of the approved minutes are available from the city or town clerk and the ordinance is not operative until thirty days after the ordinance or minutes are available.         At the state level, an application for initiative or referendum is submitted to the secretary of state under A.R.S. §19-111. At the city level, the application is submitted to the city or town clerk. Therefore, at the county level, pursuant to §19-141(A), an application for an initiative or referendum is submitted to the county officer in charge of elections. Again, the application is not submitted to the clerk of the board of supervisors, the county recorder or any other department of the county. In the present case, the county officer in charge of elections for Pinal County is Mr. Gilbert Hoyos.

       Upon presentation of an application for referendum petition, §19-142(C) provides that the city or town clerk shall provide a "full and correct copy of the ordinance or resolution in the form as finally adopted" to the applicant. When the application involves a county matter, this section provides that the county officer in charge of elections shall provide the materials. This section does not provide that the clerk of the board of supervisors or the county recorder or any other county department or officer shall provide the materials. Rather, the reference is specific to the designated officer specified in A.R.S. §19-141(A). 

       Moreover, the statute does not contemplate any action or obligation by the petition proponent to submit the materials for circulation to the city or town clerk or county officer in charge of elections. The statute does not say that upon application, the city or town clerk or county officer in charge of elections "shall direct" the applicant to the appropriate officer or department to obtain a copy of the materials or that the applicant "shall submit" a copy of the materials for circulation. Quite the contrary. §19-142(C) is specific that the city, town or county officer in charge of elections "shall provide such person or organization with a full and correct copy of the ordinance or resolution in the form as finally adopted."

2. On May 16, 2001 the Materials for Circulation Were Not Available From the Defendant County Elections Director and the Time Period for Circulating Petitions Did Not Begin.        On May 16, 2001, Intervenor submitted its Application. After submitting the Application, Intervenor was advised by Defendant Director of Elections that the materials for circulation were not available on that date. Contrary to Plaintiffs’ assertion, Intervenor did not request a copy of the minutes of the board of supervisors’ meeting. Intervenor simply requested a copy of the materials for circulation with the petition and was advised by Mr. Hoyos that the materials were not available. 

       §19-142(D) provides that if the materials for circulation are not available from the city, town clerk or in this case the officer in charge of elections on the day the application is submitted, the time limit specific in §19-142(A) for circulating the petition does not begin to run until the time the materials become available from the city or town clerk or county officer in charge of elections. Again, the statute is consistent in its format. An applicant submits an application to the appropriate local official, receives the materials for circulation from that official and if the materials are not available from that official on the same day the application is made, the time limit for circulating the petition does not begin to run until the materials are available from that official and when the petitions are complete, they are submitted to the same official to whom the application was originally made. The statute does not envision and by its language does not require that a petition proponent submit an application to one official, go to another official for the materials for circulation and then turn in the petitions to yet another official. 

       The reason the statute does not require an referendum applicant to interact with multiple government officials is simple. The time period for circulating these petitions is short, and depending upon the jurisdiction involved, the number of signatures necessary to collect during that short time period can be great. Requiring a referendum applicant to interact with multiple government officials would place an undue burden on the constitutional right to circulate a referendum petition. Although the courts have stated that a referendum applicant must strictly comply with the constitution and statute in circulating such petitions, the requirements may not unduly burden the constitutional right to circulate referendum petitions. Homebuilders Association of Central Arizona V. City of Scottsdale, 186 Ariz. 642, 925 P.2d 1359 (App. 1996).

       Plaintiffs’ argument that because copies of the ordinances passed by the board of supervisors were available on May 16, 2001 from the clerk of the board of supervisors or from the county recorder later that week overlooks the statutory scheme entirely. Because §19-142(C) refers to "city or town clerk", Plaintiffs imply that the corresponding officer in the county is the clerk of the board of supervisors. As demonstrated above, the clerk of the board of supervisors is not the officer in charge of elections in Pinal County under §19-141(A), is not the officer to whom an application for referendum petition is submitted under §19-142(C) and is therefore not the officer from whom the materials for circulation are received. As of May 16, 2001, the date the Application was submitted, the materials for circulation were not available from Defendant Director of Elections. Accordingly, the time period for circulating the referendum petition did not begin to run on that day.

3. The Materials for Circulation Did Not Become Available to Intervenor Until May 31, 2001.        After being told that the material for circulation were not available on May 16, 2001, Intervenor was informed by Defendant Director of Elections to return to his office a week later, May 23, 2001. Before returning that date, Intervenor telephoned Mr. Hoyos to inquire whether the materials were available and was specifically advised they were not. At that point, Mr. Hoyos informed Intervenor that he would advise them when the materials became available. When Intervenor did not hear from Mr. Hoyos or anyone else in his office, Intervenor telephoned Mr. Hoyos on May 30, 2001 to inquire about the materials. In multiple conversations on that day, Mr. Hoyos repeatedly advised Intervenor that the materials for circulation were not available. Furthermore, he advised Intervenor that his office was "on top of it", working with the County Attorney to make sure they "got it right."

       The next day, May 31, 2001, Ms. Kazda and Mr. Pierson went directly to Mr. Hoyos’ office to inquire about the materials. After several hours of waiting, Mr. Hoyos finally provided to them the materials for circulation. Under §19-142(C) and (D), May 31, 2001 is the first day the materials for circulation became available from the only public officer in charge of elections in Pinal County, Defendant Director of Elections. Under §19-142(C) and (D), the time period for circulating the referendum petitions did not begin until May 31, 2001.

4. Defendant Director of Elections Determined the Materials for Circulation.        Plaintiffs argue it is unreasonable to expect that the government must determine which materials are appropriate to circulate and that Intervenor, because it is presumed to know the law, also must know which materials to circulate. Again, Plaintiffs overlook the precise language of the statute. The statute obligates a referendum proponent to submit an application which includes a description of the matter being referred. A.R.S. §19-111. Once the application with this petition description is submitted, the appropriate official to whom the application is submitted can determine what materials fit that description. As discussed above, on receipt of the application, A.R.S. §19-142(C) requires the city or town clerk or county officer in charge of elections to provide the applicant with a full and correct copy of the matter being referred. 

       In this case, the following petition description was submitted by Intervenor on May 16, 2001:

Ordinances PZ-006-01 and PZ-PD-006-01 of Pinal County, Arizona, approving a multiple zone change from (GR) General Rural Zone to (CR-2), Single Residence Zone (106.0± acres); (CR-3), Single Residence Zone (3,434.9± acres), (SR) Suburban Ranch Zone (785.9± acres), (CR-4) Multiple Residence Zone (63.4± acres); (CB-1) Local Business Zone (130.2± acres) and (CB-2) General Business Zone (79.7± acres) and Planned Area Development Overlay District on 4,600± acres to develop 8,516 dwelling unit, mixed use Willow Springs - South Village Master Planned Community situated in Sections 8,9,14,15,22,23,25,26&27, T8S, R13E and Sections 20,29 & 30,T8S, R14E (Willow Springs Area).

       After reviewing the petition description, Mr. Hoyos determined he could not provide a full and correct copy of the ordinance or resolution as finally adopted on May 16, 2001. It was not until May 31, 2001 that Mr. Hoyos believed he could comply with his obligations under A.R.S. 

       A.R.S. §19-142(C) to provide such materials. On May 31, 2001, Mr. Hoyos provided Intervenor with copies of the ordinances, resolutions and minutes of the board of supervisors relating to the petition description. The reason Mr. Hoyos chose to supply all of these materials to Intervenor is unknown. Intervenor did not specifically request the minutes or resolutions. Intervenor requested the ordinances adopted by the board of supervisors evidencing their approval of the rezoning and PAD. In interpreting the petition description, Mr. Hoyos apparently believed the ordinances consisted of all the materials that he supplied.

       Not only did Mr. Hoyos review the materials he supplied to Intervenor on May 31, 2001, Mr. Hoyos had the County Attorney review the materials. After presenting the materials to Intervenor wanted to make sure what was being provided was correct. Mr. Hoyos stated he believed the materials were correct but that he could have the County Attorney also review the materials. The County Attorney reviewed the materials that same day and indicated the materials provided were correct. Furthermore, Mr. Hoyos documented this approval in a Memo dated May 31, 2001. After providing the materials to Intervenor, copies of the materials were attached to each and every petition circulated. Intervenor did not delete any of the material. Prior to May 31, 2001, Mr. Hoyos did not indicate that only a portion of the material he supplied was available. He simply indicated that the materials were not available. On May 31, 2001, Mr. Hoyos determined that the materials satisfying the petition description were available and provided such to Intervenor. On May 31, 2001, Mr. Hoyos fulfilled his statutory obligation under A.R.S. §19-142(C).

5. The Petitions Were Timely Submitted.

       Plaintiffs argue that even if the beginning date for circulation did not begin until May 31, 2001, the petitions were untimely filed July 2, 2001 because that day was more than 30 days after May 31 and the ordinances became effective prior to that time. The problem with this argument is twofold: in the first instance, Intervenor was specifically advised that the due date for the petitions was July 2, 2001 because the 30th day fell on a weekend when the elections office was closed. Secondly, Plaintiffs assume there is a constant date when an ordinance becomes effective which is also not the case. Because the time period for circulating petitions can be a movable date, the time period for when the legislation being referred is also a movable date.

       As demonstrated above, the time period for circulating a referendum petition does not start to run until the materials for circulation are available from the appropriate local official in charge of elections. This is not a fixed date. The only officer who can determine when the materials are available is the officer responsible for elections to whom an application for referendum petition is submitted. Likewise, the only officer who can determine when the petitions are due is the same elections officer.

       A.R.S. §19-111 provides that a referendum proponent shall submit an application to the secretary of state (and in the case of a county measure to the officer in charge of elections) on a form supplied by the secretary of state. The application for petition is a form created by the secretary of state’s office and provided to all local election officials pursuant to A.R.S. §19-111. Intervenor completed the appropriate application form and submitted it to the Defendant Director of Elections. On the form, there is a box entitled "FOR OFFICE USE ONLY" which requires the appropriate elections officer to complete when an application is submitted. One of the items to be completed by the elections officer is the "Deadline for Filing". However, the "deadline for filing" depends upon when the materials for circulation become available from the elections officer and is not always determine the day the application is submitted.

       Unlike other sections of Title 19, the 30 days prescribed in A.R.S. §19-142 do not refer to "calendar" days. For instance, A.R.S. §19-121.03 provides for two 10 days periods within which challenges to the government regarding petitions must be made. In both instances, those challenges must be made "within 10 calendar days". Yet there is no similar limitation in A.R.S. §19-142. Even the term "calendar" days under A.R.S. §19-122(A) has been recently interpreted to mean that the deadline is expanded until the next business day when the deadline falls on a weekend. In Fisher v. City of Apache Junction, 353 Ariz.Adv.Rep. 11 (App. 2001), another case arising in Pinal County, the Court of Appeals determined that because the tenth calendar day for filing the challenge fell on a weekend, the challenge could be filed the next business day which was a Monday.

       The same logic should be applied in this matter. Where the deadline for filing, whether it a deadline for filing a challenge or filing petitions occurs on a weekend, that deadline is extended until the next business day since it is impossible to file on the deadline if the governmental office necessary for filing is closed.

       Plaintiffs argue that if the deadline for filing is on a weekend, then petitions must be submitted early. That argument overlooks the fact that it is a public official who determines when the time period begins and ends. Because the time period for circulation does not begin to run until the materials for circulation are available from the appropriate elections officer, the elections officer is the sole official in charge of determining the beginning date. It would be a simple matter to always make the documents available only on a Thursday or Friday of any week to ensure that the 30th day fell on a weekend, thereby reducing the amount of time for signature gathering. Such an interpretation unfairly penalizes referendum proponents in the exercise of their constitutional rights.

       The principal case relied upon by Plaintiffs, Uhlman v. Melton, 66 Wash.2d 157, 401 P.2d 631 (Wash. 1965) is distinguishable. In that instance, the relevant referendum statute provided that the petitions were due "prior to the date when any ordinance shall take effect", 401 P.2d at 632. More importantly, there is nothing in the case which says that the elections official determined the due date for the petitions as in the present case.

       In the Arizona system, the due date for the petitions is determined by the appropriate election official, which is the purpose of the box "FOR OFFICE USE ONLY" on the application form. On May 31, 2001, Defendant Director of Elections personally inserted the words "July 2, 2001" as the due date after calculating the date in the presence of Ms. Kazda and Mr. Pierson. When asked specifically if that was the date for filing, Mr. Hoyos replied that it was.

       Under the circumstances, Pinal County is estopped to deny the date for filing as July 2, 2001. The Connecticut case cited by Plaintiffs, Waterbury Homeowners Association v. City of Waterbury, 28 Conn.Supp. 295, 259 A.2d 650 (Conn. 1969) on the issue of estoppel is not on point with Arizona law. The Arizona Supreme Court decision in Valencia Energy v. Arizona Dep't of Revenue, 191 Ariz. 565,959 P.2d 1256 (1998), instead provides the analytical framework for governmental estoppel. The case begins with a reminder that, in Freightways v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 129 Ariz. 245, 248, 630 P.2d 541, 544 (1981), the Arizona Supreme Court announced its disapproval of the "no estoppel against the sovereign" rule. Id. at § 11. The Court reiterated the three elements of equitable estoppel: "(1) the party to be estopped commits acts inconsistent with a position it later adopts; (2) reliance by the other party; and (3) injury to the latter resulting from the former's repudiation of its prior conduct." Id. at § 35.

       In Pingitore v. Town of Cave Creek, 194 Ariz. 261, 981 P.2d 129 (App. 1998) rev. den’d., the Court of Appeals further explored the elements of governmental estoppel. As to the first element, the court stated: "the action claimed to be relied upon by the party asserting estoppel must have been taken by or have had the approval of one authorized to act in that circumstance", 194 Ariz. at 265. In this case, Mr. Hoyos, the Pinal County Director of Elections was the sole person responsible and authorized to determine (1) the materials to be circulated and (2) the date the petitions were due. In fact, Mr. Hoyos personally delivered the materials for circulation on May 31, 2001 and personally inserted the day of July 2, 2001 into the Application for Petition Serial Number. 

       The second element of reliance is established because Intervenor was required to obtain the materials for circulation only from Mr. Hoyos. As discussed above, A.R.S. §19-142(C) provides that it is the duty of the city/town/county official in charge of elections to provide the materials for circulation. They do not come from any other source and petition proponents are not obligated to seek the materials from any other source. The reason is obvious. To require petition proponents to seek out the materials from various possible sources within the city/town/county government places an unreasonable burden on the right to referendum. The fact that the ordinances may have been available on May 16, 2001 from other sources within Pinal County is irrelevant because the only authorized source of delivery of these materials to Pinal Citizens was Mr. Hoyos and he stated he did not have the materials on May 16, 2001 or anytime up to May 31, 2001.

       Furthermore, Ms. Kazda’s Affidavit demonstrates that Mr. Hoyos acted with full authority and with full knowledge of the County Attorney’s office in determining and providing the materials for circulation. Mr. Hoyos acted in supplying the materials only after full consultation with the County Attorney’s office. When questioned by Ms. Kazda about whether July 2, 2001 was the due date, Mr. Hoyos stated it was but also stated they could have the packet reviewed by the County Attorney. The entire package, including the Application, was given to the County Attorney for review. The memo of May 31, 2001 confirms this fact conclusively. Intervenor had every reason therefore to rely upon Mr. Hoyos’ actions when he provided them with the materials for circulation and when he inserted the due date for the petitions.

       The third element is obvious. If the petitions are rejected on the basis that the due that the Defendant Director of Elections wrote on the Application is no longer correct, the constitutional rights of the thousands of persons signing the petition will be denied. Referendum rights are fundamental rights guaranteed to every citizen in Arizona pursuant to the Arizona Constitution. They may not be denied based upon an arbitrary decision now to change the due date for the petitions. These petitions were turned in on the deadline established by the Defendant Director of Elections, not after that deadline. These petitions were timely filed.

III. CONCLUSION

       Summary judgment is not appropriate because there are factual issues of dispute as to when the materials became available from Defendant Director of Elections. The petitions were timely filed because they were submitted on the deadline determined by the Defendant Director of Elections and not afterwards. Intervenor should not be penalized in the exercise of its constitutional rights where it was specifically advised by the public official in charge of elections and the only authorized person to determine when the deadline for filing the petitions occurred. Intervenor respectfully requests that the Court deny the motion for summary judgment.

       Dated this 26th day of October, 2001.

RAVEN & AWERKAMP, P.C.
 

Anne C. Graham-Bergin
Attorney for Intervenor

 
 

Copy of the foregoing delivered this
26th day of October, 2001 to:

Jeffrey Willis
Wade Swanson
Snell & Wilmer
1 S. Church, Suite 1500
Tucson, AZ 85701

Copy of the foregoing electronically delivered
and mailed by first class mail this 26th day of 
October, 2001 to:

William McLean
Allen McVey
Pinal County Attorney’s Office
P.O. Box 887
Florence, Arizona 85232

Copy of the foregoing mailed by first class
mail this 26th day of October, 2001 to:
Clerk of the Superior Court

Pinal County
100 N. Florence Street
Florence, Arizona 85232-2730