NEWS

Officials Offer Contradictory Explanations of Cover-up
by J.C. Huntington
Dateline: Phoenix Arizona, Saturday, December 2, 2000

Steve Holland, UA director of risk management and safety, and Nancy Turner, president of Turner Laboratories, offered contraditory explanations as to why a test that found contamination in groundwater taken from a Page-Trowbridge monitoring well was withheld from the Arizona Department of Environmental Quality and the public.

Holland and Turner's explanations for the withheld test were published in the Op-Ed section of the Nov. 15 edition of the San Manuel Miner.

Withholding the test from ADEQ, allows the UA to claim that it cannot be confirmed that Page-Trowbridge is leaking contaminants to groundwater.

The explanations offered by Holland and Turner contradict each other and the facts.

Holland claims that there was only one test performed on samples taken April 26 from monitoring well #5 at Page-Trowbridge.

Fact check: Reports from Turner Labs show 2 tests were run on the sample from MW #5. The first test was run on May 2 and the second on May 3. Both tests detected toluene, a federally regulated contaminant, and confirm that Page-Trowbridge is leaking to groundwater.

Holland claims that the reason only one test was performed was because the lab did not have a duplicate sample; Holland claims the duplicate sample was in a refrigerator at UA risk management office.

Fact check: the Chain of Custody form, used to document possession of the samples for legal purposes, shows both the original sample and duplicate for MW #5 were turned over to Turner labs on April 26, the same day the samples were taken.

Holland has thus far refused to explain why he would claim that the duplicate sample was in a refrigerator at his offices, when the lab records show that the duplicate was turned over to the lab.

Holland claims that the reason the duplicate was not tested was because the lab failed to notify the UA in time to have the UA take the duplicate sample to the lab. Holland said samples couldn't be tested if they are over 14 days old and that the lab failed to notify the UA that contamination had been detected in the original sample within this time limit. Holland told the Arizona Daily Star that "the lab should have told us immediately," when they detected contamination in the original sample.

Fact check: Nancy Turner, president of Turner Labs contradicted Holland in her letter to the editor by stating "it is not standard policy" for Turner Labs to notify clients when contaminants are detected.

Holland has thus far refused to answer why he would approve a procedure to validate contamination at Page-Trowbridge requiring that Turner Labs violate their policy and notify UA "immediately" when contaminants were detected.

Turner claims the laboratory withheld the results of the test performed on May 2 from the UA because, "several compounds exceeded acceptance criteria in the quality control check standard." Turner also said that the reason that May 3 test result was reported was because the test of May 2 detected toluene at a reportable level.

Consistency check: Turner claims that while the May 2 test results were good enough to use as the basis for submitting the May 3 test results, they were not good enough to report to the UA because of a quality control problem.

As of this writing, Turner has refused to explain why the lab would use the May 2 test results as the reason for reporting the test results from May 3 to ADEQ, yet withhold the May 2 test results from the UA, ADEQ and the public because of a quality control problem.

Questions Holland Has Failed To Answer

The following letter was sent to Steve Holland via Federal Express 11/20/2000. The letter was printed in the Nov. 22 edition of the San Manuel Miner.

As of this writing, Holland has not answered any of the questions put to him in this letter, nor has Holland agreed to authorize release of any and all records pertaining to the April 26 test results (e.g. phone records, the test reports, etc.).

11/20/2000

Gayle Carnes, Managing Editor San Manuel Miner
P.O Box 60
San Manuel, Arizona 85631
Fax: 520.385.4666

Steve Holland, Director of Risk Management & Safety, University of Arizona
1610 N. Vine Ave, Building #460
Tucson, Arizona 85719

Dear Mr. Holland

I read with interest your letter to the editor in the last edition of the Miner.

While the headline promised that the letter would clarify the situation regarding the recent detection of toluene at Page-Trowbridge, your letter left several questions unanswered.

For example:

You told Oracle residents (on Aug. 23) and the Arizona Daily Star (on Nov. 1) that the toluene detection in water samples taken April 26 at Page-Trowbridge could not be validated because there was no second test to verify the finding. You told the Daily Star and Oracle residents the reason there was no second test was because Turner Labs did not have the field duplicate. You said the duplicate was in a refrigerator at your offices.

The chain of custody form for the April 26 sampling event shows that the field duplicates were turned over to Turner Labs on April 26.

Would you explain why you told the Daily Star and Oracle residents that Turner Labs did not have the field duplicates, when the record shows the lab had them?

In addition to saying that there was no second test (which there was) because the lab did not have the field duplicate (which they did), you also explained to the Daily Star and Oracle residents why a retest was necessary.

You said that the re-test was necessary because the lab failed to notify your office in time for you to transfer the field duplicate to the lab and have it analyzed (the Daily Star quotes you as saying, "The lab should have told us immediately.")

In other words, the procedure you say you were using to verify contamination of groundwater by Page-Trowbridge involves several steps:

Having the lab notify you of a detection;
Having an employee prepare an ice chest to keep the duplicate at the correct temperature during transit;
Transferring the duplicate from the refrigerator in your offices to the ice chest;
Transporting the duplicate some 3.3 miles to the lab;
Checking the duplicate into the lab;
Recording the transfer of the duplicate to the lab on a chain of custody form, and finally
Analyzing the duplicate to verify contamination.

Aside from the fact that this procedure is extremely cumbersome (as opposed to merely transferring the field duplicates to the lab at the time that you give the lab the original samples), the procedure appears flawed. Specifically, the key step in the above sequence seems to be step 1) -- having the Lab notify you "immediately" when contaminants are detected. If step 1) fails, the procedure fails.

As you know, Nancy Turner, president of Turner Labs is on record as saying, "it is not standard policy" for Turner Labs to notify clients when contaminants are detected.

Would you explain why the procedure you say you were using to validate contamination at Page-Trowbridge requires that Turner Labs violate their stated policy and notify your office "immediately" when they detected contamination in the Page-Trowbridge water?

Would you explain why Turner Labs was apparently unaware they were to violate their stated policy and notify your office "immediately" when they detected contamination in the Page-Trowbridge water?

Also, as a demonstration of good faith, will you authorize Turner Laboratories to release to me any and all records from Turner Laboratories related to the April 26 sampling event? If so, please let me know the procedure I should use to obtain the requested documents.

Warm Regards,

    James C. Huntington
    6141 N 16 Drive
    Phoenix, Arizona 85015

Questions Turner Has Failed To Answer

The following letter was faxed to Nancy Turner, president of Turner Laboratories, Inc. and the editor of the San Manuel Miner 11/27/2000.

As of this writing, Turner has not answered any of the questions put to her in this letter.

Nov. 27, 2000

Nancy Turner, President Turner Laboratories Inc.
2445 N. Coyote Dr
Tucson, Arizona 85745
Fax: 520.882.9788

Gayle Carnes, Managing Editor San Manuel Miner
P.O Box 60
San Manuel, Arizona 85631
Fax: 520.385.4666

Dear Ms. Turner;

I read your letter to the editor in the Nov 15 edition of the San Manuel Miner and learned that it was Turner Laboratories that withheld the report of the tests confirming toluene has been detected in groundwater beneath the Page-Trowbridge landfill, not the UA.

Since withholding a report confirming contaminants have been detected in groundwater taken from beneath a radioactive/toxic waste landfill is a matter of some importance, I have a question I hope that you will answer.

In your letter to the editor, you tell us that Turner labs performed two separate tests on water taken from Page-Trowbridge Monitoring Well #5 on April 26. You say the tests were done on two separate days with the first test performed May 2 and the second test done May 3.

Your letter also tells us that even though toluene, a federally regulated contaminant, was detected in both tests one of the test reports was withheld from the UA, and I wonder why that is the case.

Specifically, your letter says that Turner Labs reported the May 3 test to the UA because the test of May 2 detected toluene at a reportable level.

Even though the test of May 2 detected toluene at a reportable level, your letter tells us that Turner Labs withheld the May 2 test results because, "several compounds exceeded acceptance criteria in the quality control check standard."

My question is this: why did Turner Labs use the May 2 test results as the reason for reporting that toluene was detected, yet also withhold these same results from the UA?

In other words, it seems as though the May 2 test either showed a valid detection of toluene or it didn't.

If the toluene detection in the May 2 test was not valid, why did Turner labs use an invalid test as the reason for reporting that toluene was found in the May 3 test?

If the toluene detection in the May 2 test was valid, why was that report withheld from the UA, the ADEQ and the public?

Warm Regards,

   James C. Huntington
   6141 N 16 Drive
   Phoenix, Arizona 85015

Reading The Chain Of Custody Form

The following links will enable readers to read and understand the Chain of Custody form that shows both the original and duplicate samples were turned over to Turner Labs April 26.

This form contradicts Holland's claim that the reason a second test was not run was because Turner Labs did not have the duplicate sample.

Two methods of reading the form are provided. One method will take more time than the other, but allows reading of the form on a step by step basis, which may aid in understanding.

Step by Step

Click on image for step by step analysis of the Chain of Custody Form

Clicking on the image to the right will allow you to step through the Chain of Custody form on an entry by entry basis.

Since each page contains an image, this method of reading the form will take longer to read than the "all at one time" method, but may help in understanding the form.

All At Once

Click on image to view annotated Chain of Custody form

Clicking on the image to the right will reveal the chain of custody form with annotation explaining the entries.

Printable Form

Click on image to view the Chain of Custody form in printable form

Clicking on the image to the right will reveal an image of the Chain of Custody form that is suitable for printing. The image is oriented vertically to allow printing on 8 1/2 x 11 paper.

A color printer is suggested.

The Chain of Custody Form

Click on image to view the Chain of Custody form

Clicking on the image to the right will reveal an image of the Chain of Custody form with no annotation.

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